Ardunio code for construction and execution of Hardware Trojan Horse Mouse attack



The security vulnerability associated with USB based attacks continues to exist and presents a real danger to billions of computer users in the world as Hardware Trojan Horse Devices can automatically breach a computer system. The research community has not fully understood the security risk related to USB. USB protocol of poorly regulated device self-identification provides the opportunity for Hardware Trojan Horse Device to represent itself as a Human Interface Device.

The importance of this study is the construction and execution of Hardware Trojan Horse Mouse attacks that is connected to a USB end point of a personal computer. The work presented the scenario of attacks by a mouse with its own processing capabilities. The outcome of the work has proven that USB protocol remains open for exploitation. It highlights an important security risk because the attacks remain undetected by the latest operating system, security policies and anti-malware. The work further explained the components required and the procedural guideline to implement the attack to reproduce the outcome of the experiment and the capability of possible attacks that can be executed using the available command.

In conclusion, the work shown here brings attention to the deficiencies of USB in handling the authentication of devices connected to its end point. Therefore, Hardware Trojan Horse Devices can be customized with a variety of device classes to exploit these deficiencies.


The components in the Programmable USB HID Mouse

The components in the Programmable USB HID Mouse


This code has a document (59 pages) which describe the algorithm in detail.




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[17] M. Jodeit and M. Johns, “USB Device Drivers: A Stepping Stone into your Kernel,” in European Conference on Computer Network Defense, 2010.

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